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Abstract 
WTO is facing an unprecedented crisis. Multilateralism and international cooperation 
have crashed, not only because of a virus. Can WTO panelists don the strait jackets 
designed by the ‘automatic’ dispute settlement system of a non-supranational trade 
organisation, in order to find a ‘positive solution’ but without rulemaking? This paper 
 
         
argues that in cases in which trade rules play a lesser role, WTO can rule against 
globally coherent solutions. The present WTO impasse offers a surprising avenue for 
panelists and arbitrators, to apply peremptory international non-trade law and 
customary law principles (ius cogens). This window is open right now – thanks to the 
automatic adoption of adjudicator findings, such as, what is known as a non-violation of 
WTO rules. Emerging case law and the work of forward-looking academics show how to 
address measures with deleterious social and eco-dumping effects, unacceptable to the 
body politic at large. Complaints against trade-distorting human and labour rights 
violations, and perhaps even against measures causing excessive global warming, could 
lead future adjudicators to answer the repeated call of the presently defunct Appellate 
Body for a ‘holistic’ reading of WTO rules, across the fragmented international legal 
framework. WTO’s reputation would regain lost ground where it matters, namely in 
constituencies looking for better international governance and a level-playing field. 
A Introduction 
This paper tries to show the limits of the brilliantly crafted ‘automaticity’ of WTO dispute 
settlement, in cases when ‘positive solutions’ cannot be found without rulemaking. 
Automaticity is the essence of what is called the ‘Crown Jewel’, because it avoids the 
supra-nationality stigma of ‘foreign judges.’ The ambiguity lies in the clear prohibition of 
rulemaking, despite the equally clear commitment to multilateralism. The automaticity 
applying to the whole dispute settlement process (except where there is a ‘reverse’ 
consensus) reflects the intent of the drafters to ensure rulings while preventing 
adjudicator ‘overreach’ or ‘judicial activism’. This was particularly important for the 
interpretation of WTO agreements and rules breaking new ground with the GATT 1947.1  
Problems arise when rulings remain entirely within WTO Law even when the violation of 
trade rules is only a collateral damage in the implementation of a legitimate societal 
concern. A paralysed WTO, unable or unwilling to reinterpret rules or to adopt changes 
or exceptions, cannot find a solution – unless ‘automatic’ adjudicators and MPIA 
arbitrators having the ‘last word’ show the way. 
1 An Unusual Disclaimer 
At the outset, I wish to point out that all deliberations in all WTO panels are confidential, 
and must remain so ‘even after the panel process and its enforcement procedures, if 
any, are completed.’ (Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WT/DSB/RC/1), 11 December 1996). This 
explains why the story of the panel deliberations for ‘positive solutions’ in the sense of 
Art 3.7 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) remains closed for eternity. 
Hence, this paper could easily disappoint outsiders interested in questions like ‘how did 
you get elected?’ or ‘who held the pen?’ or ‘which outside pressure had which impact?’ 
For the same reasons I will not comment on the importance of the WTO Secretariat’s 
role portrayed as a problem in the US ‘overreach’ argument. (Pauwelyn, J and Pelc, K, 
                                                            
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, 55 UNTS 194 
 
         
2019)2 Neither will this paper offer any comments on the proposals for the 
reinstatement of the Appellate Body (AB)3 or on the debate about its functioning in the 
first 20 years.4 
Most of the debate about the present stalemate, in WTO negotiations as well as for 
dispute settlement, is held de lege ferenda (‘WTO Members should’). Hence, my de lege 
lata contribution (‘yes we can’) might still be of some interest. 
2 Structure, and Conclusions 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The ‘Crown Jewel’ has a negotiating 
history trying to define the fine line between protection and protectionism, and the 
issues around ‘automaticity’. (B) This explains some of the quandaries which 
adjudicators face in their deliberations when they have to read unclear texts, especially 
those at the fuzzy border between international economic law (IEL) and non-trade law. 
(C) The research question therefore is whether the orthodox approach prevailing in most 
rulings – the prohibition of rulemaking, and the ivory tower of case law – prevent 
genuine answers to IEL challenges and non-trade concerns. (D) I will then discuss two 
instances where grave and systematic human rights violations, or excessive global 
warming, can modify conditions of competition – without WTO even starting to discuss 
how to counteract such challenges to international governance. (E) Some contributions 
from forward-looking scholars on governance, labour rights and climate change 
mitigation could show a way forward. (F) As long as WTO’s General Council fails to 
agree on adequate reinterpretations, changes, or waivers, adjudicators finding rules 
incoherence for party claims might look for certain provisions under Public International 
Law (PIL) or Customary International Law (CIL). (G) The research hypothesis is ‘yes, 
but’ ONLY for ius cogens and as long as litigants make such claims based on 
international standards. At the end of the day, however, only a brave panel will be able 
to answer AB calls for ‘holistic’ rules interpretation and, where necessary, look beyond 
WTO Law now that the fear of ‘overreach’ has become even stronger. My conclusions 
                                                            
2 This article has been heavily criticized in a 10 November 2019 guest post by Pieter Jan Kuijper, Emeritus 
Professor of the Law of International (Economic) Organizations, University of Amsterdam, in International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog, downloaded on 13 August 2020 at 
https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/10/guest-post-some-remarks-on-who-writes-the-rulings-of-the-
world-trade-organization-a-critical-
assessm.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ielpblog+%28Inte
rnational+Economic+Law+and+Policy+Blog%29) 
3 Already back in 2018, Mary Footer saw a vote – the ‘nuclear option’ – as a way out of the consensus 
blocking of new AB members by the US, foreseen if not prescribed by Article IX:1 of the WTO Agreement. 
(Footer, 2018, p 22) 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann considered that the ‘Crown Jewel’ had been stolen by US trade diplomats, 
without any intention of giving it back. (Petersmann 2018) 
4 In his study of the first 20 years of dispute settlement, Joost Pauwelyn criticises Rob Howse’s thesis of 
the ‘Appellate Body “distancing itself” from WTO members or the Geneva-based trade policy elite’ and 
argues that ‘panels and the Appellate Body have, for the most part, skilfully read, reflected and responded 
to underlying and evolving WTO member country preferences.’ According to Pauwelyn, this is not (as 
Howse posits) a ‘True Court of World Trade’; rather, is is ‘judicial minimalism’ and ‘the subtle, informal 
symbiosis’ which ‘bolsters the internal legitimacy and makes the overall system digestible to WTO 
members.’ (Pauwelyn, 2016) 
 
         
use the present WTO crisis as an opportunity, because ‘automaticity’ means that panels 
and arbitrators now have the ‘last word’ (H). 
B Who Crafted the Crown Jewel? 
The Uruguay Round negotiators were civil servants mostly hailing from Trade Ministries, 
or trade experts in specialised Foreign Affairs agencies. When rules enforcement was on 
their agenda, the aim was to solve international trade disputes with international trade 
law. Somewhat surprisingly, considering the weak predecessor under GATT 1947, the 
result seemed to work well in the new WTO: compliance was the rule, with only a few 
nontransparent ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’ (MAS) as exceptions. The Ivory Tower 
rejoiced, in concert with the erstwhile and much of the present scholarship. For the first 
time in history, a multilateral but not supranational intergovernmental organisation had 
set up a dispute settlement system with binding and enforceable rulings: if you step on 
my foot, I can get WTO to make you lift it. 
True, not all respondents, big and not so big, always complied with all DSB rulings. But 
disagreements on rulings like for ‘zeroing’ or ‘national security’ became the prime 
divisive issues much later. Some out-of-court settlements do look like face-saving 
devices or outright dirty deals. Third parties sometimes wonder whether the MAS had 
properly reestablished their market access rights. Non-compliance affects the balance of 
rights and obligations even when governments are unwilling or unable to convince their 
legislative arm to modify an incriminated legal provision. When ‘retaliation’ also fails to 
induce the modification, this is a systemic problem where neither the adjudicator nor the 
arbitrator can find a solution. 
Overall, however, virtually every case ended with the withdrawal of the incriminated 
measure, or a new balance between rights and obligations. Mysterious terms like ‘non-
trade concerns’ (appearing only for trade in agriculture, and in the Doha Round Agenda) 
were never assessed by a panel. 
The first systemic cracks appeared when trade measures and ‘good’ subsidies came as a 
response to societal objectives. 
Trade pundits were surprised to find that protecting ethnic minorities seemed to require 
trade-distorting measures. Adolescent smokers of perfumed cigarettes, cute baby seals 
and adult dolphins, and nearly extinguished sea turtles outside territorial waters lined up 
for protection on the shores of Lake Geneva. Regulations prescribing plain cigarette 
packaging, unhealthy food labelling, or the indication of cow and pig origins, claimed 
consumer information without a trade barrier. 
Subsidy wars reached new heights with large civil aircrafts, even though everybody 
knows that thousands of jobs as well as national security interests loom behind 
airplanes. Food security became a non-negotiable catch-all phrase for many farm, 
stockpiling and food processing subsidies, as well as for export credits and international 
food aid.  
All that before Covid-19 also hit the regulatory screens… 
 
         
1 What’s Protection got to do with WTO?  
Adjudicators must interpret treaty texts without changing them, even when, for reasons 
discussed below, some such texts are far from being crystal-clear. 
Similarly, accession protocols asserting the ‘inherent right to regulate trade to promote 
fundamental non-trade objectives […] in a WTO-consistent manner’ do not confer any 
additional rights to a Member, notwithstanding incantations by litigants and panelists 
(eg AB Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para 221). 
Clearly, the fine line between protection and protectionism means that the assessment 
of a measure under WTO Law can only be made separately for each case. 
Tariffs are the only legal exception protecting domestic producers at the border. Hence 
the need for schedules, for trade in goods (and services). Subsidies, obviously, require 
rules against excessive trade distortions. However, health measures may sometimes 
serve domestic constituencies at the expense of foreign suppliers. The cost of a 
mandatory label may affect foreign and domestic products differently. But looking at the 
import prohibition of genetically modified animal feed, say, one may wonder where 
protectionism comes in, if that prohibition  means that your own producers pay more for 
domestic feed than their competitors on the world market. 
2 The Problem with Automaticity 
The near-total automaticity enshrined by the DSU ensures the establishment of a panel, 
a panel report, and a DSB ruling – even if the trade element is minimal. Initially though, 
adjudicators were quite content to apply the covered agreements in order to draw the 
fine line between protection and protectionism. 
In times of crisis, when the very existence of both multilateralism and dispute 
settlement are at risk, it is of utmost importance to read international trade rules as 
much as possible in accordance with current regulations and values. Without the ‘holistic 
approach’ demanded by the AB, despite its own flaws, the often-claimed higher moral 
ground of multilateralism becomes moot. 
Even so, there are cases where clinging to automaticity produces counterintuitive rulings 
which the drafters of the DSU wanted to avoid. Trade must remain a means. Free trade 
is not the objective of WTO. 
Can panelists do something about their standard terms of reference acting like a strait 
jacket? 
C Deliberation Quandaries 
The life of a panelist is not always easy. Though it can be. Rumours have one panelist 
boasting on a golf course with the number of case folders in his shelves, all unread, and 
claiming he just signed off the panel draft without ever having read a single line. 
(Needless to say that this person never served on another panel.) Others are too happy 
to follow the suggestions by the Secretariat, even more when looking at the ever-
 
         
increasing number of preceding cases which only a computer-assisted brain can see 
clearly. I am glad to say that this, in my own recollection, is a small minority. Most 
panelists actually over-invest, despite their relatively small remuneration in comparison 
with arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). As we will soon see, panelist efforts do not often lead to innovation. 
At the outset, panels often face three types of rule interpretation difficulties: what is a 
‘positive solution’? How to avoid ‘rule making’? And how to stick to WTO Law when non-
trade concerns are at stake? 
1 Finding Positive Solutions with Unclear Texts 
‘The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a 
dispute.’ (DSU-Art 3.7 Second sentence) Clear and simple, right? Hence, the standard 
terms of reference adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are to ‘find a positive 
solution’ regardless of the clarity or ambiguity of the text. The fact that no panel ever 
failed to produce a report without a positive solution means that all interpretation 
quandaries had disappeared. The panel, or the AB, simply claimed to have found the 
original intention of the different negotiators. 
Now we all know that texts agreed at the end of one of those infamous ‘last nights’ 
might lack clarity. Some negotiating stories have left their traces in a Note by the WTO 
Secretariat, or in the preamble to an agreement. Also, the calculation of a tariff 
reduction formula can be a confidential item, entering the public domain much later. 
Hence, claims of ‘dirty tariffication’ in a tariff schedule inevitably fail. 
Regrettably, perhaps, for the search of legislators’ intent, there are no publicly available 
negotiating session records or draft texts. Unlike national legislators whose 
parliamentary deliberations and drafts are in the public domain, most WTO treaties, 
tariff reduction formulas, and other provisions, are simply gavelled through. When a 
government submits a treaty for acceptance by its legislator, it naturally claims that its 
own views and priorities largely prevailed.5 
When unclear texts demand interpretation, adjudicators may look for the objectives of a 
treaty and ask the parties for their opinion. They do so because haruspicy is not an 
ordinary attribute of a desperate adjudicator looking for ‘jurisprudence’ and ‘case law’. 
Hence, they cannot read in the entrails of WTO legal texts the meaning of terms absent 
from the DSU, or customary international law (Kolb, 2016).  
                                                            
5 For example, a somewhat whimsical Article 14 in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), consisting of just 
one lonely sentence in the whole of Part VIII, consisting of just one article (entitled ‘Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures’), posits that ‘Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.’ Actually, this pleonastic affirmation appears already in the AoA-
Preamble. It seems the US Government demanded and then invoked it when it assured Congress, in 
1994, that WTO would end the ‘hormone-beef war’ with the EC. Until today, however, growth hormones 
are prohibited in Europe, and the EU will not knowingly import meat or dairy produced with Somatotropin. 
And for the same reason Ractopamine, a growth hormone for pigs narrowly accepted by Codex 
Alimentarius, may soon reach the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
 
         
Now that ‘case law’ and other such terms are formally banned from WTO user 
handbook, the life of arbitrators in the new MPIA will be even more difficult. (WTO, 
JOB/DSB/1/Add.12 dated 30 April 2020) In practice, however, both the arbitrators and 
the parties are likely to continue invoking WTO jurisprudence. 
2 Rule Interpretation without Rulemaking 
Adjudicators trying to read unclear texts face several difficulties. This paper addresses 
four of them. 
First, WTO Law is a Lex Specialis – regardless whether negotiators had common or 
codified law in mind. This means that text interpretation must follow, first and foremost, 
legislator intent. As we will see later, even references to procedural law in other than 
WTO treaties can be problematic. 
Secondly, disagreements between panelists occur quite naturally, given their varied 
background. When such discrepancies appear as dissenting opinions (always 
anonymously), they can hardly claim to be a real contribution to a coherent reading of 
treaty texts, let alone a prelude to a change in jurisprudence. In my opinion, they are 
simply a failure in panel governance. 
The third and perhaps the biggest hurdle is the search for a standard of review. This is 
as old as the GATT. Negotiations in various formats, including by reference to the Doha 
Development Agenda, and considerations in panels and in the AB, have not resulted in 
an agreed general WTO Standard of Review or a specific standard, such as for trade 
remedies. Without a formal decision by the DSB or the General Council in respect of 
standard of review, however, panelists regularly face the dilemma in their interpretation 
quandaries, between deference and intrusiveness. This is also true for health and 
environmental disputes. Lukasz Gruszczynski argues that ‘the investigation of the WTO 
panel remains intrusive when assessing the objectivity and coherence of the reasoning 
included in a contested risk assessment. The same is true with respect to the 
permissible inquiry into underlying methodology.’ (Gruszczynski 2013, p 757) 
Just looking at the literature discussing the major SPS cases it becomes clear that a 
standard of review defining regulatory autonomy remains out of reach, even though 
Markus Wagner, a renowned SPS expert, considers that the AB has made the limits for 
standard of review and for deference absolutely clear: ‘panels are not to perform de 
novo reviews and enter into a substantive investigation of a WTO member’s measure 
[but] panels do not need to be fully deferential to the decisions of domestic agencies’. 
(Wagner 2016) 
Ross Becroft has also studied the various standard of review principles and options. He 
proposes a new standard of review applying not simply to all obligations in a uniform 
fashion, but to specific (WTO) obligations. Using the SPS Agreement as an example, he 
argues that the obligation to apply sanitary or phytosanitary measures ‘only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ (Art 2.2) contrasts 
with the specific obligation to carry out a risk assessment before taking such a measure 
(Art 5.1) (Becroft, p 187). 
 
         
The fourth hurdle relates to rulemaking. Suppose the adjudicators agree on the 
correlation (or absence thereof) between objective(s) and measure(s), and on the legal 
nature of the incriminated measure. Their search for a positive solution will remain 
constrained by the unambiguous prohibition of rulemaking in the DSU: 
‘Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.’ (DSU-Art 3.2 in fine) 
Adjudicators try to make good use of the interpretation rules codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).6 For good measure, the AB frequently calls 
for a ‘holistic approach’. (AB Report EC – Chicken Cuts, para 176; AB Report US – 
Continued Zeroing, para 268; AB Report, China – Raw Materials, para 307) The VCLT 
hence appears as a useful road for rule interpretation without rulemaking. 
Yet, if we look very carefully at the instances when the AB or a panel refer to the VCLT, 
it appears that these adjudicators use the interpretation rules of the Convention merely 
as a kind of reading aid, to apply the definitions found in the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
There are very few exceptions to the default pusillanimity of adjudicators. 
For instance, the Biotech Panel had to address the precautionary principle in the context 
of the Biosafety Protocol. (Preamble to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 2226 UNTS 
208 (2000) Many authors have faulted this (unappealed) ruling especially in this 
respect. (Eliason 2009) However, the panel did recognise that treaties and general 
principles of law could constitute ‘rules of international law’. It thereby rejected a 
defence brought by the United States when it ruled that it did have the discretion to 
consider such rules as ‘context’ to determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ under Article 31.1 
VCLT. (Van Damme, p 369) 
Ilona Cheyne finds a similar scenario where panelists looking at policy objectives in 
context defer to PIL and public policy exceptions as a measure of last resort. In 
reference to the dolphins and shrimps cases, she concludes that ‘even the most hostile 
panel has seemed reluctant to reject the acceptability of the policy underlying a 
measure.’ (Cheyne, p 48) 
This being, we are yet to find a smart algorithm spitting out a ruling based on the 
(admissible) claims and counterclaims, incriminated measures, and the materials of a 
given case. (In two instances, despite all the support by the parties and by the WTO 
Secretariat, including an impressive number of high-quality interns, we found that even 
document management was a huge challenge: it was not possible (i) to list all measures 
forming the ‘Banana regime’ of the European Communities, or (ii) to count the number 
of documents submitted on hundreds of CD-ROM in the course of the Biotech Panel.) 
Does the VCLT bridge end here? Does the interpretative process have to stop at WTO 
Law, waiting for self-interpretation by the General Council (based on Article IX:2 of the 
                                                            
6 1155 UNTS 331 (1980); also, in 8 International Legal Materials 679. The VCLT was adopted on 22 May 
1969. 
 
         
Marrakesh Agreement), without resorting to VCLT otherwise than as a reading aid? If 
WTO adjudicators stop at interpretation, is there not a risk of encroachment into other 
PIL and CIL that lack the stringent enforcement mechanisms of WTO Law? What about 
pacta sunt servanda? (Kolb 2016 p 129) 
3 The Need for Fuzziness 
The automaticity of WTO dispute settlement procedures, a cornerstone for the whole 
multilateral trading system, means that adjudicator reports do not require full consensus 
for the ‘positive solutions’ they propose to the DSB. The statements made by the parties 
and other Members when these reports are adopted, without a vote, indicate that 
adjudicators had to use all their skills to avoid any obvious misreading of the legal 
provisions. Only ‘cogent reasons’ can compel an adjudicator or an arbitrator to depart 
from previous treaty readings. Hence, the grey zones required for difficult rulings are a 
corollary of automaticity! 
Nonetheless, some creative ways out of these quandaries do exist. The adjudicators in 
the Tuna-Dolphin case found a very creative solution when they decided that the US 
measure was ‘calibrated’ to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods 
in different areas of the oceans. According to the AB, the regulatory distinctions in this 
case did not amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and thus complied with 
the requirements of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Needless to say, the US 
Ambassador on this occasion did accuse the AB for ‘overreach’! (US – Tuna II) 
D Public International Law vs WTO Law 
This paper posits that, if the DSU disallows the direct application of CIL and/or PIL, the 
WTO becomes a free trade fortress unable to find positive, holistic, coherent solutions. 
This matters especially today, when new risks are recognised by big and growing 
constituencies as a ‘common concern of humankind’ requiring different trade rules. The 
Crown Jewel faces not only a systemic crisis. If it cannot deal with non-trade concerns, 
it may become irrelevant – and prevent trade from making its contribution to 
sustainable development. 
When WTO only sanctions non-tariff barriers or allows antidumping, whilst it has neither 
the will nor the power to deal with trade-related sustainability, freedom of association, 
deforestation and other issues, the attention of policy-makers in search of a level-
playing field will shift to other fora. Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) now contain 
elaborate sustainable development chapters, some of them subject to substantive 
review procedures and specific dispute settlement. 
Worse, unilateralism is rearing its ugly head again – not only for steel and cars. 
Actually, there is nothing new in ‘America First’ actions, when we think of the thousands 
of ‘Voluntary Export Restraints,’ whether negotiated or not in the early GATT years, 
‘undermining the GATT prohibitions of discrimination and quantitative restrictions.’ 
(Petersmann p 107) 
 
         
What looks new though, for instance in the European Union, are standards imposed in 
the name of (self-defined) good governance, human rights, or sustainability. So far, 
sanctions against infringements did not touch any MFN commitments. But there are a 
few trade sanctions consisting in withdrawals of tariff preferences under the General 
System of Preferences (GSP) – regardless, incidentally, of this being compatible with the 
Enabling Clause. Nevertheless, in the absence of complaints by the government accused 
of violating core labour standards, for instance, there is no chance for adjudicators to 
look into the WTO-compatibility of such unilateral actions. 
Will WTO remain relevant when facing forum shopping for ‘good’ causes, and 
unilateralism proposed by ‘good governance’ advocates? Has the Crown with the Jewel’ 
become a ‘Crown of Thorns’? (Creamer 2019) Can the fortress damage international 
governance? 
A great many trade scholars are presently discussing the survival chances of WTO 
dispute settlement. They propose solutions for the selection of the AB members and for 
other stages of the proceedings. Personally, I trust that the epistemology of the DSU will 
eventually guide the reform attempts in a way that will maintain the strength of its 
healthy features, such as the automaticity, appeal, and the establishment of an 
amended balance of rights and obligations between litigants without impairing the rights 
of other Members. This may not sound very ambitious, but it is. A precious asset is case 
law: nowhere mentioned in the DSU, differently handled by continental and common 
lawyers – and now threatened by accusations of ‘overreach.’ Right now, it is difficult to 
imagine how future treaty text readings will handle the de iure disappearance of 
jurisprudence. 
Initially, however, all went well in the trading world and behind the walls of the WTO 
judiciary power. 
In the 1990ies trade expanded rapidly, most DSB rulings were complied with. The wafts 
of teargas at the Seattle Ministerial 1999 were dispelled when the conference following 
the 9/11 tragedy adopted the Doha Development Agenda in Doha, Qatar, and welcomed 
China and Taipei into a still rapidly growing world trade body. That was in November 
2001 – with bombs falling less than 1’000kms away on the presumed masterminds of 
the destruction of the Twin Towers in Manhattan/NY. Ranks closed behind the 
multilateral agenda, and the trade community at large continued to ridicule or ignore 
the anti-globalisation demonstrations accompanying big conferences in Washington, 
Davos, Montreal, Barcelona, Genoa, Cancún, Hamburg, Hong Kong, London, and 
Pittsburgh – to name only a few. 
Before we can proceed we must ask the question of the negotiators’ intent in respect of 
panelist independence and self-restraint? Does automaticity imply orthodoxy? How free 
are adjudicators to look at PIL and CIL? Can they transgress fuzzy borders or will WTO 
Law always prevail? And what did negotiators mean by ‘jurisprudence’ when they 
decided not to use the term in the DSU? 
 
         
1 Home-made Orthodoxy 
The negotiators of the DSU seem to have wanted insider panelists: 
‘Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental 
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served 
as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a 
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor 
agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, 
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.’ 
‘Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the 
members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience’. 
(Excerpts of DSU-Art 8, emphasis added) 
My personal reading of these provisions, based on my own experience as a panelist, is 
that the first quality panel members must have is a lot of insider knowledge. A dispute 
settlement system with possible ‘retaliation’ (ie punitive tariffs) for non-compliance 
could convince domestic constituencies only if these ‘foreign judges’ were carefully 
selected from within the fold. The ‘indicative list of governmental and non-governmental 
individuals’ referred to in DSU-Article 8.4 was one way to ensure allegiance (cf WTO-
Document WT/DSB/44/Rev.48 dated 13 January 2020). Without a quality check of the 
submitted CVs, this unwieldy list, presently over 18 pages long, never really served its 
purpose. 
Panelist selection is not a kind of co-optation system or the recruitment of adjudicators 
with specific skills or abilities. Rather, it remains one of the totally opaque stages in 
dispute settlement. Acceptance of this new system by the chief traders benefitted from 
the expectation that this would function well if it produced orthodox rulings based on IEL 
or, preferably, WTO Law. 
No surprise for the second quality required of all panelists, ‘independence’. The irksome 
question here would be ‘Independence from Whom?’ 
Article 8 then adds a third requirement, namely ‘a sufficiently diverse background and a 
wide spectrum of experience.’ Actually, geographical distribution had always been the 
main selection criterion for the composition of the AB. 
For panels, in the first 16 years of WTO dispute settlement history, 244 different 
individuals from 52 different countries had served as panelist individuals. Of these 
countries, 24 were developed, while 28 were developing. 20 New Zealanders and 19 
Canadians topped the list of developed country panelists, while among the developing 
countries, Chile and South Africa provided 12 and 10 panelists, respectively.7 
Ironically, very few qualified EU (and US) nationals could serve in panels, simply 
because their governments were the main DSU users. Perhaps for this reason, in 1998 
                                                            
7 Source: WTO Dispute Settlement Body developments in 2011, Speech delivered 13 March 2012, at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/speech_johansen_13mar12_e.htm#_ftnref12 accessed 27 
July 2020 
 
         
and again in 2002, the EU proposed a ‘more permanent’ Panel Body of 15 to 24 
members. (WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/1 (13 March 2002)) 
Concerned that ‘emphasis on geography rather than expertise is unwise when panels 
are hearing complex and often highly technical matters’, the International Trade 
Committee of the New York City Bar Association proposed a panel roster of perhaps 75 
well-qualified individuals who the membership believes can put geographic bias aside. 
(ABCNY 2005) 
Lack of experience can be remedied with upfront adjudicator education. However, while 
à la carte in-house training is now offered to new adjudicators, Geneva-based WTO 
Missions apparently rejected proposals for a systematic extra muros training 
programme. 
Various other DSU reform attempts failed, coming both from outside specialists and as a 
minor component of the 2001 Doha Development Agenda. 
In the new Multi-Party Interim Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) mechanism described 
below in Section D1, each member can nominate one arbitrator. As of 3 August 2020, 
all of the 10 nominations were of senior trade dispute experts. (WTO, 2020) Arbitrators 
are not AB judges, even though their findings may look very similar to AB reports. But 
specialists interested in a potential application of PIL/CIL will find in Sub-Section G2, 
Footnote 26 a very interesting possibility of MPIA arbitrators to make ‘recommendations’ 
in case of a nonviolation complaint. 
Until today, several other elements appear to still ensure an orthodox interpretation and 
administration of WTO Law, even though issues such as transparency of deliberations 
and assignments for report drafting, do not seem to be a top priority. This may frustrate 
outside academics and pundits. While the original ‘firewall’ between the Legal and Rules 
Division on the one side, and the Appellate Body Division on the other side, has 
fortunately broken down, the secrecy of proceedings also prevents more coherent 
rulings in comparable cases running concurrently, as for instance in the ‘TBT Trilogy’ AB 
decisions adopted in 2012. (Meltzer and Porges, 2013)  
At one point, even a ‘friendly insider blog’ proposal was rejected, showing a bias where 
more transparency would enhance WTO’s reputation in non-trade communities. Veteran 
staff in the Legal Division take pride in the number of panels they had served without a 
reversal by the mighty AB. Public hearings are often difficult to organize, let alone by 
online streaming like in other international courts. Notwithstanding the secrecy 
surrounding legal proceedings, even the over-protection of adjudicators and staff did not 
prevent Members obtaining Secretariat allocation changes from one SPS case to 
another, or the transfer of the Director of the Appellate Body Division in July 2020. 
2 The Force of ‘Jurisprudence’ 
Rule of Law is paramount for trade security. This includes jurisprudence. After more 
than 30 years and 500 cases, the volume of jurisprudence has become difficult to 
handle, despite the huge real-time efforts undertaken by the authors of the World Trade 
 
         
Law Net (http://www.worldtradelaw.net/index.php last accessed 9 August, 2020). Is it 
because ‘jurisprudence’ does not appear in the DSU? Who has the last word when the 
holder of the grail seems to have become invisible even to Parsifal, not to mention three 
mere-mortal panelists? Who can read rulings with more than 1’000 pages? (EC – 
Biotech and EC – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft) The power of 
precedent applies, without the DSU saying so, arguably because of the sheer number of 
previous rulings, which even the AB finds difficult to depart from. 
The question for this paper is whether WTO Law, including Case Law, is sufficiently 
resilient to accommodate new non-trade concerns. 
Good news first: the past has shown a surprising dynamism for a system designed to 
prevent ‘judicial activism’ and out-of-the-box thinking. 
When sea turtles become ‘natural resources’ quite unlike the original GATT 1947 
definition, environmental observers rejoice over the dynamic evolution of WTO 
adjudication. The same goes for the Right to invoke Public Morals pursuant to GATT-
Article XX(a) as a justification for breaking WTO rules and disciplines of any kind – 
although this right never took precedence over the non-discrimination rules enshrined in 
the Chapeau as a most powerful qualifier to that Article XX enticingly entitled ‘General 
Exceptions’. 
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent seem to trust national judges more than 
governments, and even parliaments. They argue that ‘[T]he mixed record thus shows 
that judges can play a meaningful role upholding the rule of law in the face of legislative 
or executive resistance. Even at the limit, where the resistance is extreme and 
reinforced by unambiguous legislation, the role of the judge in legal order is still to 
uphold the rule of law, so judges are duty-bound to decry its subversion.’ (Criddle, p 
77s, emphasis added) 
The auto-pilot mode has narrow limits. In the next section it becomes clear that, when 
poor international governance meets home-made inconsistency, all attempts to claim 
‘harmonious reading’ may not allow consideration even of mandatory PIL and CIL in 
dispute resolution. 
My view is that when WTO Law allows no exceptions to the prohibition of discrimination, 
precendent and case law offer even less help to adjudicators trying to take non-trade 
concerns on board. The true challenge the multilateral trading system has to face, both 
in negotiation and litigation, lies in the consistency of the solutions needed for an 
increasingly diverse and dynamic economy. This has become even more difficult when 
trade wars and unilateralism threaten to topple the delicate balance between policy 
space and market access. 
The Covid-19 pandemic showed the weak resilience of the intergovernmental 
institutions, long before non-discrimination rules could apply to trade restrictions and 
subsidy wars. When the dust has settled, will the old rules again let trade contribute to 
improved asset allocation for the satisfaction of all five basic human needs? Where is the 
red line beyond which substandard production measures constitute (never defined) 
 
         
social dumping or eco-dumping in violation of PIL? How to measure footprint when 
performance according to principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is ‘nationally determined’ ie governments are free to take the 
measures they consider fit for footprint reductions? Can trade ministers react in isolation 
to the next pandemic, or to the likely effects of climate change, with less speed but 
much more might? What if this requires a reassessment of the trade rules, in order to 
take into account the specific character of mitigation measures? How can resource-poor 
farmers reduce their carbon footprint when their small or inexistent exports produce 
more GHG per unit of output than the meat or milk of their competitors? 
E Two Dead-end Rows for WTO Adjudicators 
Interpreting rules without rulemaking looks like mission impossible. Yet, it is a 
temptation of the kind also faced by Homer’s Ulysses. Are adjudicators ever to be torn 
between the Scylla of DSU automaticity, transforming panelists into foreign judges, and 
the Charybdis of ‘overreach’ accusations becoming a vortex in which WTO itself might 
drown. 
The true impossibility of the mission lies elsewhere: incoherence at the national level, 
combined with the failure of international governance, could produce even worse 
results, if free trade rules cross peremptory red lines of non-trade law. 
This section discusses two examples where in my opinion even ‘harmonious reading’ by 
adjudicators may not be able to bridge the gap between trade law and PIL/CIL, as 
prescribed by the Vienna Convention. 
1 Forced Labour: no Red Lines? 
Social concerns and labour rights are the source of a lot of PIL and CIL. Slavery is one of 
the few uncontested forms of human rights violations. The protection of plantation 
workers was the objective of one of the first Conventions of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Today, one million children are reported to work on plantations in 
Côte d’Ivoire which supplies 40% of the world’s cocoa. Despite evidence of trade 
impacts, no such a case ever made it through a WTO dispute. Notwithstanding the 
empty claims of numerous politicians as to ‘mutual supportiveness’ and inter-
organisational cooperation in the form of events and speeches, the subject of Trade and 
Labour remains taboo even for litigators. 
Environmental or animal welfare issues are a frequent item on the DSB menu. NGOs 
frequently report scandalous violations of PIL: instances of forced labour, ‘sea slaves’ (ie 
‘undocumented’ workers from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines 
trying to reach South East Asia but forced to work for years on fishing ships) and 
inhuman working conditions in plantations, vegetable farms and slaughterhouses. When 
such cases go viral in social media, processors and retailers have to react. Not so the 
world’s #1 trade organisation. Where there is no complainant, the DSB and its 
adjudicators sit idle. 
 
         
This seems strange, because ‘freer trade’ without accompanying measures can easily 
clash with human rights, association and trade union liberties, safety at work, and 
working conditions. Couched in WTO language, labour standards can impact on 
conditions of competition, and distort trade. But ‘Social Dumping’ is a term unknown to 
WTO lawyers. 
Is there no red line? And who has the right to complain in the DSB? 
Surprisingly, one dispute involving peremptory labour standards violations did appear on 
the agenda of the DSB. 
When the US State of Massachusetts banned companies doing business in or with 
Myanmar from government procurement contracts, the European Commission lodged a 
complaint in the WTO in order to protect its business interests. (In so doing, it ignored 
European human rights concerns and parliamentary resolutions. It also turned a deaf 
ear to furious calls by trade unions and NGOs for the imposition of economic sanctions 
against Myanmar.) In the ‘consultations’ pursuant to DSU rules, the EU did not deny the 
existence of human rights atrocities happening in Myanmar; it invoked US violations of 
non-discrimination obligations under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. 
When these consultations did not lead to a solution, the DSB established a panel on 21 
October 1998, to examine these complaints.8 
The relation between WTO law and human rights raised in this case might have found an 
answer, in the existence of ius cogens, for interpreting WTO rules. Unfortunately, after a 
US federal court struck down the relevant Massachusetts State Law on constitutional 
grounds, the case was suspended sine die. No chance for panelists to stick their necks 
out. 
Are labour rights an aporia in WTO (ie, in philosophical terms, a dead-end road)? 
Perhaps not. Interestingly, a kind of standard was within reach. Based on Article 33 of 
the ILO Constitution (to secure compliance with recommendations), the International 
Labour Conference as the highest ILO organ recommended on 14 June 2000 that 
governments, employers and workers ‘in the case of Myanmar take appropriate 
measures to ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to 
perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour’ – to be implemented 
‘unless the Myanmar authorities promptly take concrete action.’9 
It is far from being clear whether this resolution – the first since the establishment of 
the ILO in 1919 – would have allowed a WTO panel to decide which trade restrictions 
                                                            
8 Myanmar was not a party in that case, but Burma was a founding member of the WTO. At the Second 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva (18 and 20 May 1998) Major General Kyaw Than, Minister for 
Commerce, expressed the view that the WTO had no mandate to enforce core labour standards, through 
trade sanctions, nor call into question the comparative advantage of low-wage countries, and that labour 
standards should not interfere with globalisation of free trade nor become bargaining chips for 
protectionist forces. 
9 International Labour Conference, Resolution concerning the measures recommended by the Governing 
Body under article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the subject of Myanmar. 88th session, Geneva 2000 
(223, 318, 352). 
 
         
are ‘necessary’ and hence WTO-compatible under GATT-Article XX (and/or Art. XXI). 
Such a panel would also have to consider whether 257 votes in favour, 41 against, and 
31 abstentions, could constitute ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole’ (Art. 53 VCLT). Interestingly though, the US Congress 
referred precisely to this ILO resolution when it enacted the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act 2003 restricting trade with Myanmar.10  
The so-called ‘race to the bottom’ – a lowering of protection levels despite commitments 
in all recent RTA not to administer labour laws with a view to improving one’s 
competitive position in trade or foreign direct  investment (FDI) – has been shown to 
occur only in high income countries, and in RTA between such countries rather than with 
low or middle income countries (Häberli, Jansen and Monteiro, 2012). 
Go it alone with your market power? Two examples show how the USA and the EU, the 
two largest economies with strong social concerns, pursue what they consider as human 
rights or labour violations. 
Remarkably, and without asking the WTO or the ILO for permission, the US government 
applies government procurement restrictions against what it considers as labour rights 
violations.11 In respect of child labour, it regularly publishes a list of goods from 
countries where it has ‘a reasonable basis to believe [these goods] might have been 
mined, produced, or manufactured by forced or indentured child labor’. Importers of 
such products ‘must certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine 
whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the items supplied’.12 
When the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh collapsed, on 24 April 2013, killing 1’129 
mostly female garment industry workers unprotected by national building regulations or 
international labour standards, the only ‘sanction’ from the developed world was a 
threat of GSP withdrawal, followed by a long and still lasting cooperation and monitoring 
project initiated by the EU under the auspices of the ILO. Actual GSP withdrawals by the 
EU for nontrade concerns do happen, for instance in Belorussia and Myanmar – and 
significantly, in Cambodia (August 2020). As for the USA, the annual GSP renewal 
process is a recurring event celebrating parochial interests such as those of a domestic 
producer threatened by duty-free sleeping bags from Bangladesh. For reasons 
pertaining to social and labour rights, the US tried to suspend preferential tariffs in 
Guatemala and Peru (freedom of association), and in Honduras (child labour).  
For both the EU and the USA, their WTO obligations under the Enabling Clause never 
seemed to play a role. But no MFN benefits were ever withdrawn for social rights 
                                                            
10 Cf Cassimatis, A E, ‘Human Rights Related Trade Measures under International Law: The Legality of 
Trade Measures Imposed in Response to Violations of Human Rights Obligations under General 
International Law’ International Studies in Human Rights, Volume 94, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden/Boston 2007, p.436. 
11 Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child 
Labor 
12 ILAB/DOL, List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor. The Report is available at 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-products last accessed on 2 August 2020. 
 
         
violations, except for the so-called blood diamonds mentioned below (Sub-Section F2), 
by way of a waiver authorising such sanctions. 
Does unilateralism in pursuit of universal social objectives have its good sides? Trade 
restrictions may enhance Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). However, compatibility 
with present WTO rules – even a withdrawal of GSP! – remains unclear, as long as the 
trade community does not recognise ILO standards as mandatory PIL. 
2 Climate Change Mitigation – a Call for Action 
The UNFCCC (‘Paris Agreement’) unambiguously commits all it 169 parties to global 
warming mitigation.13 Unlike the predecessor agreement (Kyoto Protocol, 2007), it has 
no list of implementation measures. Yet, articles 2 and 3 prescribe product 
differentiation between otherwise identical products but with different carbon 
footprints.14 
This raises the first major problem. The formula of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC), previously agreed by Heads of 
State in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and reconfirmed in Bali and Copenhagen, contrasts with 
the discrimination prohibition enshrined in the multilateral trading system. Prominent 
and still unsolved examples are those infamous ‘like products’ with different (non-
product-related) production and processing methods (ppm). Numerous WTO rules and 
disciplines prohibit like product discrimination by way of tariffs and other duties and 
charges, and by regulations depending on carbon footprint, or for a service/transport 
mode/type of energy used, or according to distance travelled. The same goes for import 
restrictions, carbon taxes and other border adjustments. 
For agrifood production, investment and trade, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) discussed these instruments together with a review of their implementation under 
the Paris Agreement (FAO, 2018). While research, development, and extension policies 
rarely raise trade disputes, this is no longer the case for domestic subsidies, even 
though WTO does set some limits to trade distortions (never a RTA). The same goes for 
import quota management according to footprint. And so on. When we come to those 
border adjustment measures (BAM) favoured by most agricultural and mainstream 
economists, political scientists, and climatologists, such measures seem to conflict with 
many more WTO rules. (Häberli, 2018) 
                                                            
13 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). UNTS 
8 July 2016, Chapter XXVII-7-d, Registration Number 54113 
14 Article 2, para 2: ‘This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’ 
Article 3: ‘As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are 
to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts […] with the view to achieving the purpose of this 
Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while 
recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this 
Agreement.’ (emphasis added) 
 
         
What happened in the WTO? Sadly, policymakers, trade diplomats and even trade 
scholars seem to ignore, or to avoid discussing trade and investment implications of 
climate change mitigation – even within the intimacy of the trade community. 
The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment merely discussed examples of climate-
smart treatment of the ‘non-product-related ppm’ – without addressing the problems 
which WTO non-discrimination rules and disciplines represent for climate change 
mitigation. 
The WTO Committee on Agriculture is yet to examine climate-related BAM, domestic 
subsidies, prohibitions, or restrictions. Some business practices have been improved by 
new technologies and by private sustainability standards. But no intergovernmental 
standards for climate-smart agriculture exist as a benchmark for assessing 
governmental measures as a type of ‘climate green box’, or on the contrary as a form of 
eco-dumping. 
The second major problem lies in the way UNFCCC and WTO address the Development 
Dimension. The CBDRRC principle prescribes development-friendly implementation (and 
financing). But it leaves parties free on how to take the development dimension into 
account in their ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ (NDC). This is so because all 
emissions, regardless of their origin, have a global impact.  
In contrast, WTO takes a restrictively designed road to development. This has three 
implications.  
1. The so-called Special and Differentiated Treatment (SDT), foreseen in all WTO 
agreements for developing country products and services, appears incapable of 
taking into account the fact that climate-friendly action can exacerbate condition of 
competition. As for subsidies, climate mitigation measures already opened a Pandora 
box for taxpayers in rich countries. No UNFCCC principles address the resulting race 
between the tortoise and the hare. Photovoltaic panels without state support 
instruments are a rarity. ‘Climate-smart’ farming proposals need protection against 
‘non-smart’ imports – or subsidised self-discrimination for a few happy farmers in 
rich countries. 
2. Beyond the usual deadline extension and lesser commitments, SDT only allows for 
limited climate-friendly measures, and only for all developing countries or all (UN-
designated) least-developed countries (LDC) – regardless of their carbon footprint.  
3. Last but not least, no SDT provision helps developing country exports to meet more 
stringent import standards in developed country markets, claiming climate-
friendliness before being recognised as such in UNFCCC/COP.15 
There is no WTO ruling in this matter. So far.16  
                                                            
15 The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC. For details 
on the conferences COP3 – COP25, see https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-
the-parties-cop last accessed on 22 August 2020. 
16 Even before a formal complaint was lodged in the WTO, the European Union had to ‘suspend’ its 
Aviation Directive (2012) whereby all airlines, regardless of their origin, had to acquire and ‘surrender’ to 
the European Union allowances for the CO2 emissions of their aircrafts landing anywhere in the EU – 
depending on the distance travelled. Now, assuming the Global Market-Based Measure (GMBM) of the 
 
         
Yet, three signs on the wall show no way forward for climate mitigation-related trade 
measures. 
1. In over a dozen disputes, measures protecting or promoting renewable energies 
failed under WTO non-discrimination rules.17  
2. As for consumer information, the origin of meat and dolphin-safe tuna cans got into 
WTO troubles. Food health labels regularly raise ‘specific trade concerns’ in the TBT 
Committee. Hence, even labels signalling products with a smaller or bigger footprint 
may raise trade concerns by foreign suppliers.  
3. For agriculture, there is no dispute, probably because not one of the NDCs already 
notified, mandatory under the Paris Agreement, has a commitment to reduce CO2 or 
methane emissions in agriculture. (FAO, 2018) 
Is this a second aporia? 
Perhaps. But we won’t know unless WTO embarks on, and contributes to, a 
comprehensive critical review of the climate-relevant trade and investment rules at the 
international level, namely involving energy, agriculture and trade regulators, supported 
by scientific, economic and legal expertise. Such a review could help to avoid that 
conflicting policies, measures and rules jeopardise the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement – without opening the door to unfettered producer protection. Climate 
mitigation and adaptation requires maximum policy space, without a negative impact on 
other countries, or unnecessary restrictions to trade and investment, especially in poor 
developing countries. This intergovernmental and inter-institutional review is urgent, 
because the results should provide as quickly as possible the legal security necessary for 
regulators, negotiators, NDC developments and reviews, and international standard-
setting processes. 
The Corona pandemic may be but a rehearsal for a response to Climate Change (and a 
largely failed one to boot). But climate is arguably a much bigger test to resilience of 
humankind than child labour. In addition, it has a trade impact well beyond the appeals 
to ‘buy domestic face masks’. 
Whether any UNFCCC commitments can ever claim ius cogens status is a completely 
open question, especially in the absence of any measures, or standards, identified as 
fulfilling/implementing ‘Paris obligations’. Admittedly, the length of the list of 
peremptory international law depends on who holds the pen. No adjudicator ever got 
close to even suggesting in an obiter dictum a possible recognition of commonly agreed 
crimes such as slavery. Arguably, however, global warming and its ‘collateral 
                                                            
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted in 2016 turns out to be successful, together with 
the Carbon Off-setting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), the chances for the 
new EU’s ‘Roadmap’ published on 3 July 2020 serving to implement CORSIA appear largely improved. 
17 The Indian Solar Panels (DS 456), Canada’s Hydro-Energy (DS 412 and DS 426) and most other 
renewable energy programmes found problems with several WTO rules, for good and less good reasons. 
Nonetheless, more recent energy BAM are worth noting here. For instance, the USA, after it withdrew 
from the Paris Agreement, is now planning to credit imports with the ‘foreign cost of carbon’ already paid, 
and with GATT-Article XX language built into the scheme. 
 
         
catastrophes’ – including the first human-induced mass extinction of animal species – 
may soon be considered as a ius cogens justification for certain mitigation measures. 
The Paris Agreement acknowledges that climate change is a ‘common concern of 
humankind’. In my opinion, this is a call for immediate action in the trade community. 
Adjudicators alone may not be able to stem the aporia. Before compliance becomes a 
legal issue in the DSB, it may be necessary for the General Council to reinterpret, 
modify, or waive trade rules and disciplines. 
F Emerging ‘Holistic’ Doctrines 
Presently, the WTO impasse seems to prevent even a look beyond the atrium of the 
world trade body. But perhaps this opens the door for new avenues and creative 
solutions from the research community? 
Let’s look at the proposals for more equity and more governance as a response to the 
crisis, including procedural innovations, and then at the comments in respect of 
social/labour and environmental/climate concerns. All in a nutshell and focusing on the 
implications for adjudicators. 
1 Trade, Equity and Governance 
Thomas Cottier, one of the most senior and frequent GATT and WTO panelists, and a 
MPIA Arbitrator, posits that Article 28 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is the normative foundation for social and economic rights in the international 
economic order.18 While the quest for justice and global equity predates this milestone 
treaty, Cottier agrees with Peter van den Bossche that equity ‘did not play an important 
role in shaping the multilateral trading system.’ The process, however, ‘works towards 
greater coherence.’ Hence, ‘equity […] makes an important contribution to maintaining 
and restoring trust in law and thus also in international economic law’ (Cottier, in 
Prévost 2019, pp 121 and 137s) 
Calling for ‘Constitutional Justice’ as the foundation of multilevel trade adjudication, 
Petersmann argues that the universal nature of human rights and of access to justice, 
‘consent by governments has become an insufficient justification for international 
adjudication’ (ibidem p 111). 
A rather positive view comes from Kristina Daugirdas, an international lawyer who 
recently moved from Geneva to Michigan. She acknowledges that the United States 
never accepted that international organisations could create CIL independently. 
Nevertheless, referring to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Reparation for 
Injuries, she considers that international organisations with ‘powers which ... “are 
conferred upon [them] by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of 
[their] duties” can create’ CIL directly when their practice and opinio iuris ‘count 
                                                            
18 ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized.’ 
 
         
separately and apart from the views of their member states’ (Daugirdas, 2020, pp 202 
and 207) 
Even Gabrielle Marceau and Joel P. Trachtmann are quite positive in respect of the 
regulatory autonomy under the three defining WTO Agreements GATT, SPS and TBT. 
They describe the innovative approach by the AB when it decided – without defining 
‘protectionism’ under GATT-Article III which ‘only prohibits discriminatory treatment’ – 
that what mattered was how a measure was applied, thereby rejecting the need for ‘the 
“aims-and-effects” approach to the national treatment obligation, at least as a search 
for subjective intent.’ (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, EC – Asbestos, and Korea – 
Various Measures on Beef) On the other hand, no innovation seemed to come forward 
for the definition of ‘like products’ under TBT-Article 2.1. (US – Clove Cigarettes) 
Marceau and Trachtmann also describe at length how WTO jurisprudence for the 
parameters of the ‘necessity test’ (and ‘material contribution’) changed the traditional 
GATT reading of Article XX. (Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines), EC – Asbestos, Brazil – Tyres (2007) and US – Gambling) Nevertheless, 
the limits for adjudicator innovation end with WTO Law: ‘The WTO adjudicating bodies 
do not have the capacity to determine rights and duties under non-WTO rules.’ 
However, adjudicators must ensure that the ‘interpretative process of dispute 
settlement will yield a degree of convergence.’ (Marceau and Trachtmann, 2014) 
More recently, Marceau reviews the ‘evolutive interpretation’ which international judges 
have been trying to apply for decades in their findings, when societal values have 
evolved since the adoption of the law. For WTO, she concludes that the AB is 
increasingly practicing this type of rules interpretation, and that this is covered like in 
other international for a, albeit in different ways, by Articles 31-33 of the VCLT. 
(Marceau 2018) 
Maastricht, in the heart and at the cradle of Europe, has often been a venue for forward-
looking lawyers and other thinkers. Two unrelated events focused on decision-taking in 
order to remedy the fragmentation of international law and to improve governance. 
(1) A still optimistic, international conference ‘In Search of Effective Global Economic 
Governance: The Case of the World Trade Organization’ brought together academics, 
WTO officials, government representatives and trade diplomats, representatives of 
business associations and NGOs at the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University. On 4 and 
5 February 2005, this conference developed a comprehensive research agenda for the 
institutional reform of the WTO. Participants agreed that the consensus requirement and 
practice made decision-making in the WTO problematic. In Mary Footer’s opinion, ‘the 
most pressing issue is the break-down of the consensus decision-making process 
[…AB…] which threatens to undermine the effective functioning of the WTO dispute 
settlement’. (Footer, 2018, p 34) However, for different reasons no alternative emerged 
as a clear improvement, despite the failures of the Ministerial Conferences in Seattle 
(1999) and Cancún (2003), and the proliferation of RTAs. As for Secondary Law-making 
by WTO Bodies, the discussants acknowledged the development of rules and standards 
by WTO panels and the AB’s judicial rule-making eg for burden of proof, due process 
and good faith. An appropriate comparative analysis of the WTO with other international 
 
         
organisations with respect to secondary rule-making might help WTO to gain greater 
independence from its Members, and an enhanced role for the WTO Secretariat. As a 
result, more effective global governance would reflect the growing number and role of 
developing country members, and respond to the challenges by civil society to the 
legitimacy of the WTO and its rules. Finally, the Secretariat’s role of servicing dispute 
settlement panels could be enhanced if and when a Permanent Panel Body was set up 
within the organization. (Van den Bossche and Alexovičová, 2005) 
(2) The International Commission of Jurists has been debating extraterritorial 
obligations of states over a number of years. On 28 September 2011, the Maastricht 
Conference on Effective Global Economic Governance adopted the Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.19 Two key conceptual foundations shape these principles:  
‘First, states, when conducting themselves in a way that has real and foreseeable effects on 
human rights beyond borders, must ensure that they respect and protect rights, as well as in 
some circumstances, fulfil rights. Second, international law, most pointedly in the area of 
economic, social and cultural rights, demands prescriptively that states act to realize rights 
extraterritorially through ‘international assistance and cooperation’. The task of the Principles 
is to enunciate the legal parameters in which these obligations are to be discharged.’ 
(Salomon and Seiderman, 2012, p 458s) 
A more prominent role of adjudicators might also be welcome for Pauwelyn & Pelc who 
had concluded their study on ‘Who Writes the WTO Rulings?’ by submitting that ‘the 
Secretariat may thus have contributed to the very “overreach” that members like the US 
are lashing out against. Correcting this “overreach” and resolving the current crisis at 
the WTO may then, paradoxically, require a greater voice for adjudicators, and a 
reduced role for the Secretariat.’ (Pauwelyn & Pelc, 2019, p 1; emphasis in the original) 
2 Trade and Labour Rights: Yes but How? 
With respect to labour rights, scholars offer different views. According to Jeroen 
Denkers, the (US) countermeasure in Myanmar was inappropriate because it was not a 
sanction against the (not un-contested) ius cogens violations, but against companies 
operating legally under the regulations both in their home (EU, Japan) and host states 
(Myanmar). He also points out that a right to derogate from WTO non-discrimination 
obligations may not automatically imply an obligation to do so with any type of 
countermeasures. 
For Francis Maupain, a leading labour expert, the isolation in which the US acted on the 
ILO Resolution may explain the ‘marginal impact’ it had on the prevalence of forced 
labour in Myanmar. Besides, it created an opportunity for India and China ‘to expand 
                                                            
19 The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States were developed over a two year period 
between 2009 and 2011 and subsequently adopted by a group of leading human rights experts at a 
meeting in September 2011 convened by Maastricht University and the International Commission of 
Jurists. They try to tackle the question of extraterritorial obligations in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
 
 
         
bilateral trade and solidify their relationship with the regime then in power’. (Maupain 
2013 p 157) 
Joost Pauwelyn finds that the example from Myanmar is a case where panels could and 
should apply non-WTO rules and accept a WTO-inconsistent measure ‘specifically 
imposed or permitted’ by a decision subject to the ILO dispute settlement mechanism: 
even if other States were not ‘obliged to impose a trade embargo on Myanmar […] who 
is the WTO to question the validity of ILO decisions?’ (Pauwelyn 2005 p 218s, emphasis 
in the original) 
Similarly, Ilona Cheyne fully supports the idea that public policy can serve as a defence 
for some kind of discretionary use: 
In sum, there appears to be significant convergence of practice in reviewing measures 
justified as public policy. The acknowledgement of a wide but not unlimited discretion is 
accompanied by the use of all five control techniques. However, the undefined character 
of the public policy justification highlights another strand – the concept of common or 
shared interests – as a method of setting boundaries on unilateral State discretion. The 
case law demonstrates that tribunals will employ the concept of shared interests as part 
of determining the appropriate standard of review and due deference even when those 
interests have not been expressed and refined through negotiated processes such as 
legislation. This idea of commonality finds its roots in a functional need, rather than an 
overriding normative source such as human rights. It acts as a benchmark when 
assessing the legitimacy of public policy, including the extent and nature of its impact on 
other members of the group. (p 56) 
We are not in real disputes here. No DSB ruling has ever privileged PIL over WTO Law. 
Moreover, intergovernmental coherence is even more elusive than national good 
governance. For instance, where human rights cases confront state immunity, CIL has 
not evolved so far as to categorically deny state immunity. The European Court of 
Human Rights recognised this when it looked at a ruling of the ICJ: 
‘the recent judgment of the ICJ in Germany v. Italy […] – which must be considered by 
this Court as authoritative as regards the content of customary international law – clearly 
establishes that, by February 2012, no jus cogens exception to State immunity had yet 
crystallised’  
(Jones and Others v the United Kingdom, ECtHR, 14 January 2014) 
3 Trade and Climate: Review Needed 
The problem of interdependent but incoherent regimes is fully recognized: Panagiotis 
Delimatsis from Tilburg University argues that ‘[g]lobal challenges such as climate 
change, environmental degradation, protection of human dignity and public health need 
coordinated responses and cannot wait for long to be addressed.’ (Delimatsis, 2015, p 
23) 
Prospects for a dispute settlement integrating environment and trade are still bleak. A 
solid and dynamic reading of the old GATT 1947 texts, described above in Sub-Section 
D2, has allowed adjudicators in several cases to draw the line between environmental 
 
         
and producer protection. As pointed out above in Sub-Section E2, however, a dozen 
cases involving renewable energy projects failed to meet the WTO-compatibility test. 
‘Climate-smart’ policies, at any rate, first have to go through a WTO rules review. For 
climate mitigation, there is no intra-WTO awareness of the differentiation versus 
discrimination problem, let alone jurisprudence showing the way for adjudicators. 
Today, the complexity of the climate versus trade issues still extends beyond the reach 
of a new rules interpretation possibly available to WTO adjudicators.  
Unfortunately, the same is true for the regulatory autonomy enshrined under GATT-
Articles XX and XXI. 
1. Jurisprudence on the often celebrated Article XX does not seem to show a way 
forward for societal concerns such as public morals. Lorand Bartels is one of the 
fiercest critiques of the AB’s ‘ambivalent’ and ‘misunderstood’ chapeau 
interpretations, as shown in the reports for US-Gambling, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres and 
EC-Seals (Bartels, 2015). He argues that instead of enhancing the regulatory 
autonomy of WTO members, the application of this important general exceptions 
clause is far from being clear: ‘These disputes have given the chapeau a high profile, 
and yet it is still not clear what it requires.’20 
2. Could ‘national security’ based on Article XXI apply to climate change mitigation 
measures? In his thesis elaborated with John H. Jackson, Michael Hahn described this 
‘“vital interests” clause’ as an instrument close to granting a carte blanche to the 
GATT Contracting Parties, ‘to strip off any legal bonds imposed on them – leaving 
them free to apply the rules as they wish.’ (Hahn, 1991, p 559). This freedom of the 
sovereign is not even subject to the conditionality in the chapeau of Article XX which 
‘reserved part of sovereignty’ rights within a treaty based on national sovereignty ‘in 
some core domestic subject matters’ (Hahn, ibid p.558). Even if we disregard the 
recently renewed invocation by the US of this long-time dormant GATT 1947 
provision, we would still need to establish that national measures, taken to reduce 
global warming, genuinely require exemptions from National Treatment or MFN 
obligations applying to transnational trade. 
No good news either for applying climate-related non-WTO rules. In his study of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Holger 
Hestermeyer points out the fragmented character of international law, without a 
hierarchy or a centralised court system. This will not prevent recourse to non-WTO Law 
if the parties to a dispute agree. Hestermeyer agrees with Petros Mavroidis as well as 
the above-quoted Lorand Bartels and Joost Pauwelyn ‘that “the question whether a WTO 
Panel can consult sources of law other than the covered agreements […] is not 
prejudged in a categorical manner by the DSU.”’ However, Hestermeyer reads Article 7 
of the DSU as limiting the applicable law for the objective assessment panels have to 
make of the ‘relevant covered agreements’ under DSU-Article 11. Hence, ‘states cannot 
                                                            
20 According to Bartels (op cit p 96), ‘the European Union was permitted to prohibit seal products on 
public morals grounds, but because of certain exceptions in its measure, including an exception for seal 
products resulting from traditional indigenous hunts, it had discriminated arbitrarily and unjustifiably 
against seal products from Canada and Norway, including seal products hunted by Canadian traditional 
indigenous hunters.’ (AB Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products. WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted June 18, 2014) 
 
         
successfully invoke an obligation under the ICESCR as a defence against a claim of a 
violation of WTO obligations in WTO dispute settlement.’ This would even apply to CIL, 
although not to ius cogens norms which WTO Law cannot exclude. Hestermeyer 
concludes that ‘[i]f the members bring up economic, social, and cultural rights, these 
will form part of the debate – if they do not mention the rights, they will simply not 
become an issue.’ (Hestermeyer, 2014). 
This seems to allow non-WTO Law only to ‘seep into the interpretative process through 
several argumentative means’ such as a customary ‘presumption against conflict’, or 
‘harmonious interpretation’ (van Damme, 2009), or through the customary rules of 
interpretation of the VCLT. 
There is definitely not a wide opening for brave adjudicators. The door seems even 
narrower under the MPIA which foresees in Article 13 that ‘arbitrators may also propose 
substantive measures to the parties, such as an exclusion of claims based on the alleged 
lack of an objective assessment of the facts pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU.’ Footnote 
9 ominously adds ‘for greater certainty [that] the proposal of the arbitrators is not 
legally binding’. 
Similarly, Delimatsis can only express the hope that ‘[a]s interdependent regimes will 
increasingly realize the cul-de-sac that a solitary stance leads to, they will be looking for 
reconciling strategies which have to be carefully designed, along with the relevant 
actors, to strengthen productivity and enhance aggregate consumer welfare.’ 
(Delimatsis, op cit supra p.23) Written in the year of the conclusion of the Paris Climate 
Agreement (UNFCCC), this was a legitimate hope – sadly contradicted by the non-
implementation of important parts of UNFCCC until today (COP 21-25), not least 
because of the WTO-incompatibility of ‘differentiation’ of like products and countries (cf. 
Section E2 supra). 
Given the incapacity or the unwillingness of the trade community to address the 
problem, this is clearly where much more research is needed before temperatures climb 
even higher, stopping all production and trade without air-conditioning. 
G Reform: by Waivers or Changes to the Rules? Non-Violation? 
What went wrong with dispute settlement, let alone ‘holistic’ solutions? Did we throw 
away the key of the prison built by a water-tight enforcement of automaticity and non-
discrimination? How long will WTO wait before it stops condoning child labour and 
cancelling carbon border adjustments? Is WTO doomed to fail, without negotiations, 
even in the area of trade law administration? Or do adjudicators have a duty to 
‘holistically’ apply non-WTO Law when one party invokes PIL or CIL? 
The need for reforms is, I believe, directly linked to the need to get WTO out of its 
present, existential crisis. Hence, the question as we move towards the conclusion, is 
rather ‘by whom?’ 
 
         
1 Can the Membership Reform the WTO? 
The conundrum of the General Council could be resolved in three ways: reinterpretation 
or changes of existing rules – extremely rare – or a waiver conditionally dispensing from 
compliance, for a certain period. 
Perhaps, one day, the General Council will remember how Blood Diamonds earned 
Oscars before it adopted the Kimberley Waiver, on 26 February, 2003?21 To my 
knowledge, this was the only WTO decision ever which allowed MFN violations rather 
than obliging importers to treat blood diamonds from civil war-torn Sierra Leone the 
same way as jewels from Botswana – incidentally the Southern African country with the 
highest Human Development Index in 2019. (UNDP, Human Development Report 2019) 
A telling example of failed WTO diplomacy is the clumsy attempt to put labour rights on 
the young WTO’s agenda by inviting the ILO Director General to the First Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore (1996). The cancellation of the invitation at the insistence of 
developing countries refusing to even listen to a non-WTO voice resulted in an 
embarrassment and a still existing divide which inter-Secretariat cooperation and a 
couple of reports by ILO and WTO left substantially unaddressed.  
Similarly, the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment enjoys what the Secretariat 
calls ‘interesting’ discussions, for instance on the Paris Agreement – but no member of a 
WTO Delegation or the Secretariat ever accepted to discuss the fundamental issues 
described in this paper (Sub-Section F2 supra). 
The present stalemate makes General Council negotiations and decisions on rules 
reforms even more difficult. Adjudicators and arbitrators to the fore!? 
2 What can Adjudicators do? 
In the absence of negotiations and without any dispute settlement reforms, perhaps 
adjudicators can use the grey zone in which they sometimes look for positive solutions. 
They might muster the necessary courage to stick their neck out if they find their own 
path towards a positive solution. After all, no single panel or AB trio ever gave back 
their mandate to the DSB. 
We must be clear: there are strict limits in the DSU for panel deference to non-WTO 
Law. 
Nonetheless, present circumstances are not normal. The WTO crisis affects the 
functioning of all of its three ‘powers’: Ministerial Conferences are failures or postponed 
sine die. The overfishing negotiating deadline mandate by the Heads of State in the 
                                                            
21 The so-called Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) mandates participating countries to set up 
a system of internal controls excluding ‘conflict diamonds’ from being traded, and not to accept non-
certified diamonds regardless of origin. Since the establishment of the scheme in 2003, trade in diamonds 
between participants is permitted only on the basis of authentic KP ‘conflict-free' certificates. The 
Kimberley Process (KP) website is at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ last accessed 22 March. The 
WTO General Council periodically extended the KPCS pursuant to Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement, the 
last time on 26 July 2018, until 31 December 2024. (Council for Trade in Goods, Document G/C/W/753 
dated 22 June 2018) 
 
         
UNGA has been miserably ignored by WTO. The WTO Secretariat is headless. There is no 
Appellate Body. And nobody knows whether or how the new MPIA will function. 
A trade organisation with clear rules for subsidies and antidumping should also be able 
to clarify the thin line between protection and protectionism when it comes to social and 
eco-dumping. Perhaps, there is a way for adjudicators – de lege lata – against ‘socio-
dumping’ as in the Myanmar case described in the previous section. Proponents of 
‘harmonious reading’ between WTO Law and PIL think that DSU rules (and if need be, 
VCLT) will always be able to find a positive solution against child labour in violation of 
PIL.  
Perhaps the grey zone implicitly available, albeit never officially granted to adjudicators, 
is the only place where the deadlock inside WTO between adherents and opponents of 
recognising certain ‘non-trade concerns’ can be solved. Another ‘grey zone’ path, almost 
never used, is a so-called non-violation claim which we will discuss here.  
Gabrielle Marceau (and many others) considers that a good faith interpretation of WTO 
rules by adjudicators will allow in many cases for a coherent (‘harmonious’) reading of 
trade rules and human rights. (Marceau (2006) In the absence of a complaint and a 
single DSB decision, this is still an assumption. 
This paper cannot discuss ‘human rights’ or the exact reference to PIL and CIL which 
may form the bridge in a trade dispute involving non-trade law. Actually, Samantha 
Besson may lead this discussion. She designs a map of ethical and political human rights 
theories and then refers to the ‘legality of human rights’ as a bridge between the two. 
On this basis she argues for a ‘moral-political account of the nature of human rights [to 
explain] the intrinsic relationship between moral and legal human rights.’ (Besson, 2012 
p 218) 
Alexia Herwig sees nonviolation rulings – ie nullification or impairment of the benefits of 
tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 199422, in the 
sense of paragraph 1(b) of GATT-Article XXIII – as a way for finding different human 
rights violations in the WTO, such as the Right to Food enshrined in the ICESCR.23 
(Herwig, 2012)  
The new MPIA nominated by the EU, Joost Pauwelyn, argues that ‘non-WTO rules may 
actually apply before a WTO panel and overrule WTO rule’ (Pauwelyn 2016, p 577). In 
respect of child labour, he offers non-violation as a possible ruling even in the absence 
of WTO Law (ibid p 559), with a fictional example of a country resorting to child labour 
after concluding a multilateral tariff negotiation, or a RTA. This could lead a complainant 
to make a non-violation claim against ‘socio-dumped’ imports.24 Obviously, whether a 
                                                            
22 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement 1994, 1867 UNTS 154 
23 993 UNTS 3. UNGA Res 2200 (XXI) 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976 
24 ‘When we obtained your trade concession (duty-free access for our computers), we did so in the 
expectation that you would continue to respect international labor standards (in particular, not to employ 
children under the age of ten). Now you have violated these non-WTO rules (children under the age of ten 
assemble computers in your country). This violation of labor standards does not violate WTO rules as 
such, but it nullifies the trade value of your concession, a nullification that we could not have foreseen 
(you are now able to produce much cheaper computers than before and outsell our computers, which are 
 
         
WTO panel would actually find non-violation remains, in the absence of any relevant 
case law, pure speculation. All too often, Article XXIII claims were left without so much 
as a ruling. For instance, despite the insistence by Canada in US – COOL, the Panel 
decided to follow poor judiciary tradition and to apply a more comfortable ‘judicial 
economy.’ However, it set out the conditional, factual conclusions and legal 
interpretations in the event of an appeal.25 
It should also be pointed out that non-violation as a bridge for restoring the balance 
between market access rights and ‘holistic’ interpretations of the applicable law does 
not, under normal circumstances, allow for retaliation. This may have only slightly 
changed under the procedural provisions in the new MPIA.26 
A second word of caution to ‘holistic’ adjudicators may be necessary. The International 
Public Order in the sense of this Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(MPEPIL) contains the substantive rules for the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. As 
Robert Kolb already pointed out in 2001, PIL is the material foundation (‘materieller 
Kerngehalt’) of the international constitution; as such, it is clearly different from the 
derogatory rules designated under the term of ius cogens which can be a PIL attribute 
‘qui régit leur portée spécifique dans un domaine special, celui de la derogation.’ (Kolb 
2001 p 173) 
‘Forum shopping’ outside WTO is likely to continue where complainants hope to find 
‘holistic’ adjudicators. This form of ‘outcompeting WTO’ (Pauwelyn) may lead to more 
satisfactory results in a bilateral dispute than in the multilateral DSU. So far, however, 
only one case of labour rights claims found its way into a RTA case (Guatemala), where 
it was probably rejected correctly, albeit for the wrong reasons. In other words, new 
‘non-trade concerns’ may still land as an aporia in the DSB. Even though the WTO never 
managed to even address the litigation issue, with the single exception of the above-
mentioned rather bizarre Myanmar case, initiated and then suspended – and excluding 
Myanmar. (Sub-Section F2) 
                                                            
produced with full respect for international labor standards). Therefore, in the WTO we should be 
compensated for this nullification under the heading of nonviolation.’ (ibidem, p 539) 
25 Panel Reports, United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico. WT/DS384, 386/R circulated 20 October 2014, Section 
7.8, pp 187-203 
26 Such a complaint could be based on DSU-Article 26 providing in relevant parts that where the 
provisions of paragraph 1(b) or 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 ‘are applicable to a covered agreement, 
a panel or the Appellate Body may only make rulings and recommendations where a party to the dispute 
considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is 
being nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a 
result of the application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of 
that Agreement. [] Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel or the Appellate Body 
determines that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict with the provisions of a covered 
agreement […], the procedures in this Understanding shall apply.’ This paper cannot go into the 
qualifications prescribed by the rest of Article 26. However, it has to be pointed out that in such a case, 
the respondent has no obligation to withdraw the measure. ‘However, in such cases, the panel or the 
Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory adjustment.’ 
 
         
H Conclusions 
This paper shows a few very small ways out of WTO’s existential crisis. Unexpectedly, 
thanks to the crisis, some may be open to adjudicators and MPIA arbitrators. After all, 
presently they have, as it were, the ‘last word.’ 
1. Social and labour issues with a trade or investment effects abound, but only the most 
dramatic ones such as blood diamonds hit the screens with a potential to force WTO 
into action. This paper argues that when millions of children are forced to produce 
cocoa, garments, or computer chips, the reputational damage may not only affect 
retail sales at the other end of the value chain. Provided a case with a clear violation 
of cogent law (ius cogens) reaches WTO, adjudicators with a holistic view can 
address the distorted conditions of competition by reference to various sources of 
peremptory non-WTO law, invoked by a party implicitly or explicitly conditioning 
market access to good governance. 
2. Climate change is a new, potential pandemic without clear mandatory mitigation 
measures or standards acting as ius cogens. This makes applying non-trade law by 
adjudicators forbiddingly difficult. Yet, global warming will not wait for a solution to 
WTO’s present problems, nor will it accept those diplomatic claims about ‘mutually 
supportive’ energy policies and ‘climate-smart’ energy and food production versus 
trade rules. The time to act is now – not after a couple of GHG emission curbing 
measures fail the non-discrimination test in a WTO dispute. 
When going from animal welfare and environmental damage prevention to the ultimate 
pandemic called climate change, the passivity of much of the trade community is 
ominous and signals trouble ahead for many a mitigation measure. Perhaps even for 
WTO itself. Unless – again – the courage of three adjudicators shows a creative way 
forward out of the grey zone of rule interpretation without rule-making. 
The present WTO stalemate is not propitious for negotiated or litigated positive 
solutions. The candidate for improvements, saving at the same time WTO’s reputation, 
is hidden in the grey zone of multilateral dispute settlement. Whether the time for 
finding the lost jewel is sufficient, is another question. Governance, and leadership, may 
not be sufficient at national (and EU) levels, and this may prevent multilateral 
governance improvements. This, however, is a rather pointless blame game. 
When all the big pieces on the chess board are held in check – or gone – might some 
pawns make the right move? 
The argument here is that precisely in the absence of successful negotiations, or globally 
responsible litigants, panelists are such pawns with some liberty to move. If WTO 
condones child labour, or is unable to designate border carbon adjustments and BAM as 
non-discriminatory, it could fail the test of relevance in many a non-trade constituency. 
(Would anyone care?) Before that, and unless the General Council decides to apply an 
open-ended waiver protecting such measures, adjudicators and arbitrators (up to the AB 
and the MPIA) could take the cue from the respondent acting with ‘not more than 
minimal’ trade-distorting measures. The justification may fail GATT-Article XX, like so 
many renewable energy cases have failed the discrimination prohibition in the chapeau 
 
         
to that hardly ever successful defence. However, ‘non-violation’ in the sense of GATT-
Article XXIII might win the case – and satisfy public opinion at large when the 
complainant falls through a red line defined in cogent PIL (ius cogens). 
This is not an easy path to follow for any adjudicators. But is there an alternative? 
Child labour, unfortunately for the children but also for the reputation of chocolate 
manufacturers, may outlast WTO’s crisis. Climate change, however, will not wait for 
WTO to get its act together. Meanwhile, adjudicators may take advantage of the ‘last 
word’ offered by ‘automatic rulings’ and outlaw measures with a serious social and eco-
dumping impact raised in good governance complaints. In line with the essence of the 
multilateral trading system, allowing international trade to contribute to a world with 
more labour rights, more food security and more climate change mitigation. 
__________________ 
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